Judicial Review of Election Administration by Tokaji, Daniel P.
 
(379) 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
DANIEL P. TOKAJI
†
 
In response to Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of 
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Professor Christopher Elmendorf’s article
1
 is an admirable effort 
to find some order in what has often seemed an incoherent area of 
law.
2
  Although he characterizes this article as mainly “diagnostic and 
descriptive,”
3
 it clearly has normative implications.  Given the in-
creased litigation over the administration of elections in recent years,
4
 
there is an obvious need to refine the constitutional standard govern-
ing such claims.  Professor Elmendorf and I are largely in agreement 
on the analysis that courts should take in constitutional cases involving 
the administration of elections—so much so that we co-authored a 
brief to the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board, the Indiana voter identification case, which articulates a 
legal test we urge the Court to apply generally in these cases.
5
  But 
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1
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:  Expla-
nations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313 (2008).  I thank Professor Elmendorf 
for his comments on this Response. 
2
For a summary of recent commentary lamenting the incoherence of the Su-
preme Court’s election law jurisprudence, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower 
Courts:  On Judicial Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065, 1065-66 
& nn.1-6 (2007).  That commentary was part of a symposium entitled “Election Law 
and the Roberts Court,” which appears in the same volume of the Ohio State Law Jour-
nal.  See Edward B. Foley, Election Law and the Roberts Court:  An Introduction, 68 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 733 (2007). 
3
Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 327. 
4
See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation:  Reforming U.S. Election Ad-
ministration To Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 958 & fig.3 (2005) 
(displaying graphically the marked increase in election litigation). 
5
See Brief of Amici Curiae Christopher S. Elmendorf & Daniel P. Tokaji in Sup-
port of Petitioners at 2-4, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., No. 07-21 (Nov. 13, 
2007), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/ 
download_file_50876.pdf [hereinafter, Elmendorf & Tokaji Amicus Brief] (arguing 
that all “direct barriers to the casting of a valid, properly counted ballot must at least 
be reasonably necessary to important state interests,” and setting forth three factors to 
determine whether a barrier imposes a “severe” burden warranting strict scrutiny). 
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while Professor Elmendorf and I arrive at a similar destination, we 
take somewhat different routes in getting there. 
This Response focuses on three points on which I take a different 
approach—or at least place a different emphasis—than does Professor 
Elmendorf.  First, I would more clearly distinguish two categories of 
cases that his article at times seems to conflate under the rubric of 
“election mechanics”:  election administration and ballot access.
6
  The 
underlying democratic values implicated by these two areas are suffi-
ciently different that they warrant individual constitutional analyses.  
Second, when setting the level of scrutiny in constitutional election 
administration cases, I would place special emphasis on whether a par-
ticular electoral practice can be expected to burden participation by 
groups that remain underrepresented in the electorate, including 
those defined by racial or economic status.  I thus see Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections,
7
 which struck down a poll tax that differentially 
burdened poor voters, as more germane to election administration 
litigation than Burdick v. Takushi
8
 and other ballot access cases.  
Third, while I commend Professor Elmendorf’s “danger signs” ap-
proach in ascertaining the level of scrutiny,
9
 I urge greater respect for 
trial court findings than Professor Elmendorf suggests.
10
  There is un-
doubtedly a need for clarification of the constitutional standard—
something that must be done by appellate courts.  At the same time, 
election administration cases tend to turn on subtle factual differ-
ences that trial courts are generally in the best position to evaluate. 
I.  DISTINGUISHING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
 AND BALLOT ACCESS 
Professor Elmendorf characterizes his article as an effort to pro-
vide an account of the Supreme Court’s methods for “setting scrutiny 
levels in electoral mechanics cases.”
11
  In so doing he places special 
 
6
See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 345-56 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (ballot access), and Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 
51 (1973) (enrollment rules)). 
7
383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
8
504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992) (concluding that states that prohibit write-in voting do 
not “impermissibly burden the right to vote”). 
9
See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 390-91 (internal quotation marks omitted) (ex-
tracting the principle from Justice Breyer’s language in Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 
2479, 2492 (2006)). 
10
Id. at 391. 
11
Id. at 394. 
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emphasis on the line of constitutional cases that emerged from Bur-
dick, which concerned Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting and related 
regulations of ballot access.
12
  This is understandable, given the sub-
stantial weight that courts have given to Burdick in cases involving such 
matters as voting equipment and voter identification.  It does, how-
ever, risk confusing two sub-fields of election law—ballot access and 
election administration—that tend to implicate different democratic 
values and thus warrant different constitutional treatment. 
Some clarification of terminology is first warranted.  Following the 
Supreme Court, Professor Elmendorf defines his topic of “election 
mechanics” to include “the registration and qualification of voters, the 
selection and eligibility of candidates, [and] the voting process.”
13
  So 
defined, his subject would extend beyond the “nuts and bolts”
14
 of 
election administration—issues such as voting machines, registration 
rules, provisional ballots, voter identification, polling place opera-
tions, recounts, and contests, all of which implicate the question 
whether voters will be allowed to vote and have their votes counted 
accurately.
15
  It would also include the rules governing access to the 
ballot and, therefore, the choice of candidates available to voters.  I 
would avoid lumping together these two areas.  Instead, I suggest that 
the terms “election administration” and “election mechanics” be used 
interchangeably to describe the set of nuts-and-bolts issues governing 
how voters are registered, voting is conducted, and votes are counted, 
but not to include the rules regarding access to ballots. 
This is more than just a semantic point.  The areas of election 
administration and ballot access warrant separate consideration, for 
purposes of determining the appropriate constitutional test, because 
the values implicated by these two areas are not the identical.  It is cer-
tainly true that in both areas legislators or administrators may adopt 
rules that result in the “[f]encing out” of certain groups of voters, a 
term that Professor Elmendorf helpfully borrows from Carrington v. 
 
12
See id. at 333 (“[T]he Court itself understands Burdick to have marked a doc-
trinal transition . . . .”). 
13
Id. at 317  (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433). 
14
See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law as a Subject—A Subjective Account, 32 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1999) (noting the prevailing disinterest in “nuts and bolts” 
questions among legal academics at the time). 
15
For an account of litigation surrounding these and other election administra-
tion issues in the 2004 election, see generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election 
Reform:  Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1206, 1220-39 (2005). 
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Rush.
16
  In a state whose legislature is dominated by the Democratic 
Party, for example, the state might impose rules that make it relatively 
difficult for military and overseas voters to register and vote, out of a 
belief that those voters may swing toward the other party.  Ballot ac-
cess rules may be used to a similar effect.  The two major parties, for 
example, might try to fence out minor parties by passing legislation 
that makes it more difficult for them to qualify for the ballot. 
The difference is that election administration regulations tend to 
affect voters’ ability to participate in elections, and not simply the can-
didates among whom they may choose.  Historical examples of elec-
tion administration practices that had the effect of curtailing partici-
pation include poll taxes and literacy tests.  In its early years, the main 
focus of the voting rights movement was on eradicating such practices.  
After these barriers to participation were dismantled in the 1960s and 
1970s, attention shifted from vote denial to vote dilution.
17
  Advocates 
turned their attention to practices—such as at-large elections and ger-
rymandered districts—that tended to diminish the representation of 
certain groups in elected office. 
As Professor Elmendorf observes, we have now come full circle, in 
the sense that barriers to participation have again assumed “center 
stage”
18
 in the years since Florida’s 2000 election and its resolution in 
Bush v. Gore.
19
  The two most fertile topics of litigation have been vot-
ing equipment and voter identification.
20
  Relying on the Court’s deci-
sion in Bush v. Gore, advocates in several states mounted challenges to 
the paper-based voting systems used in most states, which allegedly re-
sulted in more lost votes in comparison with other available technol-
ogy.
21
  More recently, a number of states with Republican-dominated 
legislatures have enacted rules imposing stricter identification re-
quirements on those seeking to vote at the polls.  These laws have led 
to equal protection litigation as well, most prominently the Crawford 
 
16
Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Carrington v. Rush, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965)). 
17
For a more complete discussion of the vote denial/vote dilution distinction, see 
generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial:  Where Election Reform Meets the Voting 
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 718-26 (2006). 
18
Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 314-15. 
19
531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that the Florida Supreme 
Court’s vote recount procedure in the 2000 presidential election violated the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
20
See Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1072-86 (surveying lower court litigation in these ar-
eas). 
21
See id. at 1073-78 (citing cases). 
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case, which challenges Indiana’s requirement that voters show gov-
ernment-issued photo identification in order to have their votes 
counted.
22
 
What makes equal protection claims on such election administra-
tion issues analytically distinct is that they more directly implicate an 
individual voter’s right to participate in elections.  To be sure, ballot 
access rules can affect an individual voter’s ability to participate in 
elections by limiting the candidates among whom they may choose.  
At their outer limits—say, when a national government dominated by 
one party prohibits any other party’s candidates from appearing on 
the ballot—it can plausibly be argued that voters’ rights to participate 
have effectively been nullified.  But in general, election administration 
cases much more directly implicate participation rights.  Put another 
way, they implicate individual interests (ensuring that each eligible 
citizen may vote in elections without undue impediments) as well as 
systemic ones (having a fair political structure that is not skewed to 
the advantage or disadvantage of certain groups).  As I have elsewhere 
argued, equal protection analysis does and should take into considera-
tion both types of interests.
23
 
II.  TOO MUCH BURDICK, NOT ENOUGH HARPER 
It would be unfair to lay blame for blurring the distinction be-
tween election administration and ballot access at Professor Elmen-
dorf’s feet.
24
  The problem instead arises from judicial decisions, par-
ticularly those of the Supreme Court, which too often conflate these 
distinct areas. 
This problem can be traced back to Burdick v. Takushi.
25
  As noted 
above, this case involved a state’s rules prohibiting write-in ballots, 
which allegedly limited voters’ choice of candidates rather than their 
ability to participate.  It is therefore properly classified as a ballot ac-
cess case rather than an election administration case.  Yet, as Professor 
Elmendorf notes, courts in election administration cases have repeat-
 
22
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., No. 07-21 (argued Jan. 9, 2008). 
23
See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection:  On Discretion, Inequality, 
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2428, 2502-07 (2003) (describing atomistic 
and systemic theories of political equality and the shortcomings of each). 
24
In fact, he and I both think that election administration claims tend to impli-
cate democratic participation much more directly than do ballot access claims, and 
thus, in general, warrant more searching review.  See Elmendorf & Tokaji Amicus Brief, 
supra note 5, at 12-15 (discussing the difference between participatory and representa-
tional interests). 
25
504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
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edly relied on the following passage from Burdick in determining the 
appropriate level of scrutiny: 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh “the 
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindi-
cate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifica-
tions for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the 
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
rights.” 
 Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propri-
ety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a chal-
lenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to “severe” 
restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state in-
terest of compelling importance.”  But when a state election law provi-
sion imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, “the State’s important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions.
26
 
Although the facts of Burdick are far afield from the election ad-
ministration controversies that have emerged since 2000, it is easy to 
understand why courts have fixated on this language.  Bush v. Gore 
provides precedent for the application of the Equal Protection Clause 
to election administration practices, thereby constitutionalizing what 
had mostly been left to state law in preceding years.
27
  Yet Bush v. Gore 
is uncomfortably silent on the level of scrutiny that should be applied 
in such cases. 
To fill the void left by Bush, lower courts have understandably 
looked to Burdick.  Even though it was not cited in Bush and has noth-
ing to do with election administration, Burdick did at least attempt to 
explain why some election practices warrant strict scrutiny, while oth-
ers receive more deferential review.
28
   
An example of a practice that would clearly warrant strict scrutiny 
is a poll tax, like that struck down in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
 
26
Id. at 434 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983), Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992), and 
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
27
See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword:  The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 29, 48-50 (2004) (noting that the decision in Bush v. Gore, in part, ex-
pressed a constitutional concern for guaranteeing an “individual right to an equally 
weighted vote”). 
28
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (discussing the appropriate legal standards to be 
used in state election law cases). 
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tions.
29
  In fact, Harper might be considered the prototypical case in 
which an impediment to voter participation necessitates strict scrutiny.  
Decided in an era when African Americans were still disenfranchised 
throughout the South, Harper is associated with the eradication of race 
discrimination in voting.  In a sense this is appropriate, inasmuch as 
southern states’ use of poll taxes to fence out blacks was undoubtedly 
part of the Court’s motivation for deciding the case as it did.  The 
Court’s stated rationale, however, does not expressly rest on the ra-
cially discriminatory intent of Virginia’s poll tax law or even on its dis-
proportionate impact on black would-be voters.  In a footnote, the 
Court expressly disclaims this rationale.
30
  Instead, Harper rests on the 
impermissibility of the state’s conditioning participation on payment 
of a fee, a condition that could not but have the effect of excluding 
less affluent voters.
31
  Quoting from the Court’s then-recent exposition 
on the Equal Protection Clause as applied to voting in Reynolds v. Sims, 
the Harper Court identified “the opportunity for equal participation by 
all voters” as the central value at stake.
32
  Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that the poll tax should be “closely scrutinized and carefully 
confined,”
33
 an analysis that we would today characterize as strict scru-
tiny. 
While I think the lower courts have generally done a respectable 
job of handling the election administration litigation that has 
emerged in the years since Bush v. Gore, they may be fairly criticized 
for devoting too much attention to Burdick and not enough to Harper.  
This is not to deny that Burdick is of some help in providing a rough 
basis for determining the appropriate level of scrutiny.  For an elec-
toral practice to warrant strict scrutiny, Burdick tells us, it must impose 
“severe” as opposed to “reasonable, nondiscriminatory” restrictions.
34
 
The juxtaposition of these terms warrants some attention.  For 
one thing, the contrast between “severe” and “reasonable, nondis-
criminatory restrictions” suggests that a discriminatory restriction—
like the one at issue in Harper—is necessarily severe.  On this point, I 
quibble with Professor Elmendorf.  He suggests that there may be 
“discriminatory but nonsevere burdens” under the Burdick frame-
 
29
383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
30
See id. at 666 n.3. 
31
See id. at 666-68. 
32
Id. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 566 (1964)). 
33
Id. 
34
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
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work.
35
  By contrast, I read the above-quoted passage from Burdick to 
mean that a “discriminatory” restriction is by definition severe. 
Burdick is of precious little help, however, in answering a question 
that repeatedly arises in election administration litigation:  what is re-
quired to demonstrate that a particular burden is severe, and thus de-
serving of strict scrutiny?  As I have just noted, Burdick indicates that a 
burden is by definition severe if it discriminates, but it offers little 
guidance on what sort of discrimination warrants strict scrutiny.  Is 
this limited to discrimination based on race or some other suspect 
classification?  And must there be an intent to discriminate, as there 
must be for ordinary Equal Protection claims alleging discrimination? 
If we take Harper as the prototype of a severe restriction that war-
rants strict scrutiny, the answer to both these questions must be no.  
The primary focus instead should be on electoral practices that tend 
to deny equal participation in the voting process by skewing the elec-
torate.  Here again, it is worth remembering that election administra-
tion cases tend to have both an atomistic and systemic component, 
implicating both the individual’s participatory interest and the 
broader democratic interest in preventing insiders from skewing the 
process to the disadvantage of certain groups.  Both of these interests 
were at stake in Harper.  Poorer individuals were prevented from vot-
ing by the poll tax; in the aggregate, this had a disproportionate im-
pact on the political power of certain groups, particularly poor people 
and racial minorities.  The lack of any reasonable and nondiscrimina-
tory justification for the poll tax accented the poll tax’s suspect char-
acter, providing an additional reason for applying heightened scru-
tiny. 
In invoking Harper, I do not mean to overstate its utility in defin-
ing the level of scrutiny that should apply in election administration 
cases.  My argument is simply that Harper is of some value in giving 
content to the sort of discriminatory burdens that should be deemed 
severe, and thus subjected to strict scrutiny.  Harper should be consid-
ered the prototype, though the boundaries of this category remain 
nebulous. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL PROCESS 
I will not here attempt to define with any precision the constitu-
tional standard that should apply to election administration cases.  
 
35
Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 330 n.65. 
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The pending Crawford case may shed some additional light on this 
question—though I tend to doubt whether we can expect a great deal 
of clarity from the current Supreme Court, which, as many scholars 
have noted, seems hopelessly splintered on the proper judicial role 
with respect to democratic politics generally.
36
  Instead, I close with 
some thoughts on the various interests that courts should take into ac-
count and the process that should govern the resolution of election 
administration claims. 
Building on Professor Elmendorf’s article, there are three inter-
ests that are likely to arise in most election administration litigation.  
The first interest, which sets election administration cases apart from 
those involving ballot access, is voter participation.  Professor Elmen-
dorf and I agree that courts should attend not merely to the number 
of voters affected by a particular practice and the degree to which 
those voters’ participation is burdened, but also to their skewing effect—
that is, the extent to which they are likely to impose a differential bur-
den on certain classes of voters.
37
  In keeping with Harper, I urge spe-
cial attention to practices that impede the participation of those who 
are already least likely to vote, a class that might include poor voters, 
people with disabilities, and some racial or ethnic minorities.  To the 
extent that a particular practice imposes a differential burden on such 
a group, there is reason to worry that the “ins” are using their power 
to exclude the “outs.”
38
 
The second interest is the state’s asserted justification for main-
taining a particular electoral practice.  In the cases challenging punch-
card voting equipment, for example, states asserted the financial bur-
den of purchasing new equipment as part of their reason for failing to 
replace their existing systems with ones that would reduce the number 
of lost votes.
39
  In debates over more stringent voter identification laws, 
the state’s ostensible interest is in preserving the integrity of elections 
by preventing voter impersonation fraud.
40
  Where there is a severe 
burden on voters, particularly one that threatens to skew participa-
 
36
For a discussion of this division in the Court, see the authorities cited in Tokaji, 
supra note 2, at 1065-66. 
37
See Elmendorf & Tokaji Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 22-23 (criticizing the Sev-
enth Circuit’s decision in Crawford for not accounting for a skewing effect). 
38
See Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 328 & n.61 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980)). 
39
See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791, 808-09 (N.D. Ohio 2004), 
rev’d en banc, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting the state’s argument that punch-
card ballots are “cost-effective”). 
40
See, e.g., Brief of State Respondents in Opposition to the Petitions at 18, Craw-
ford v. Marion County Election Bd., No. 07-21 (Aug. 6, 2007). 
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tion, heightened scrutiny provides a means by which to look behind 
the state’s proffered interest and evaluate whether it is real or pretex-
tual. 
The third interest that tends to arise in election administration 
litigation is the cabining of judicial discretion, which can create the 
appearance (if not the reality) of unfairness in judicial decision mak-
ing.  As Professor Elmendorf aptly puts it, there is a great danger of 
courts intervening in election administration cases based on “hunch 
and anecdote.”
41
  That is particularly true in cases like Crawford, in 
which there is relatively little evidence documenting either the bur-
den on voters or the need for the challenged practice.
42
  Where there 
is such an evidentiary vacuum, it is tempting for judges to indulge 
their own presumptions about how elections work, as did Judge Pos-
ner in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Crawford
43
 and as did the Su-
preme Court in the Purcell v. Gonzalez
44
 opinion regarding Arizona’s 
voter ID law.
45
 
This leads me to the most significant contribution of Professor 
Elmendorf’s article:  his suggestion of a “danger signs” approach that 
courts should adopt in cases where hard evidence on the effect of the 
challenged practice is lacking.
46
  Critical among these “danger signs” is 
the extent to which a practice can be expected to have a skewing ef-
fect on the electorate.  As he and I have jointly argued in our Crawford 
brief, this would include the extent to which a particular practice can 
be expected to have a skewing effect on the composition of the elec-
torate, to the disadvantage of groups defined by common political in-
terests.
47
  To the extent that a certain group of voters, already under-
represented in the electorate, are less likely to have the required ID, 
we can expect their participation to be more heavily burdened.  Espe-
cially when the affected group tends to vote against the party that 
 
41
Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 379. 
42
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951-52 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“There is not a single plaintiff who intends not to vote because of the new 
law . . . .”). 
43
See id. at 951 (attempting to explain why even some eligible voters do not cast a 
ballot). 
44
See 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006) (“Court orders affecting elections . . . can themselves 
result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to stay away from the polls.”). 
45
My criticism of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Crawford and the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Purcell may be found in Tokaji, supra note 2, at 1086-93. 
46
See supra note 9. 
47
See supra note 37. 
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adopted the challenged regulation, there is particular reason for sus-
picion and thus a stronger argument for strict scrutiny. 
While Professor Elmendorf’s “danger signs” approach is a major 
contribution to the development of a constitutional standard for elec-
tion administration disputes, I am somewhat less sanguine than he on 
the extent to which this will stop judges from deciding cases based on 
hunch and anecdote.  This leads me to regard with some skepticism 
his suggestion that trial courts’ assessments of burden severity should 
be reviewed de novo.
48
  Election administration cases are by their na-
ture fact intensive, particularly when it comes to measuring the bur-
dens on voters.  Appellate judges are far afield from the day-to-day re-
alities of election administration, as compared with trial judges who 
may at least hear such evidence, and thus must rely more on their own 
gut-level or ideological presumptions.  This is not to deny that there 
should be some appellate review of trial court factual determinations.  
But I doubt whether vesting factfinding authority in appellate rather 
than district judges will do anything to diminish the appearance or re-
ality of partisanship in judicial decision making; if anything, I would 
expect such a reallocation of authority to increase it. 
In the long run, I suspect that improving judicial review of elec-
tion administration will turn less on the constitutional standards set by 
appellate courts than on the processes that are in place for achieving 
such review.  It is always a temptation for lawyers to retreat to process 
when substantive problems seem intractable.  Still, there are some im-
provements in the process for adjudicating disputes over the admini-
stration of elections that should find agreement across the ideological 
spectrum.  One is to encourage pre-election litigation rather than 
post-election litigation.  Resolving disputes well in advance of elections 
can clarify the rules of the game and reduce the risks of another pro-
tracted post-election fight like that which occurred in 2000.
49
 
Another procedural improvement would involve the creation of 
specialized election courts, as my colleague Professor Ned Foley has 
urged.
50
  It is conceivable that courts of limited subject matter jurisdic-
tion might be created, either at the state or the federal level, to reduce 
 
48
Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 392. 
49
For more on the relative advantages of pre-election litigation, see Tokaji, supra 
note 15, at 1243-44; see also Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that Purcell is “exceedingly troublesome” to the ex-
tent that it discourages pre-election litigation). 
50
See Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors:  Theory, Practice, 
Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 376-79 (2007) (suggesting a blueprint for how 
special election courts might be constituted). 
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the likelihood of partisanship and thus increase the neutrality of deci-
sion making in this area.  Finally, we should look further down the 
food chain, to the state and local institutions that actually have street-
level responsibility for running elections.  As Professor Steve Huefner, 
Professor Foley, and I argue in our recent book on the election sys-
tems of five midwestern states, these institutions play a critical role in 
our elections; yet there is good reason to worry whether they are dis-
charging their responsibilities in the evenhanded manner that we all 
would like.
51
  These institutions might be restructured to promote 
nonpartisan decision making, possibly with a model of judicial review 
borrowed from administrative law to ensure compliance with constitu-
tional and statutory norms. 
All these ideas need much greater elaboration.  They certainly do 
not obviate the need, which Professor Elmendorf’s article properly 
recognizes, to clarify the constitutional standard applicable to election 
administration cases.  In the long run, however, improving the ad-
ministration of American elections probably depends less on honing 
the standards governing judicial review than on reforming the institu-
tions that actually run elections and the processes through which elec-
tion disputes are resolved. 
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